

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION NEA-07

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EUR-08 NSC-05 PM-03 SP-02 L-01

INR-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00 /046 W
----- 044818

R 141155Z JUN 75

FM AMEMBASSY DOHA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0551

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY SANAA

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

S E C R E T DOHA 0690

LIMDIS

BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR XF MU YS SA QA YE

SUBJ: QATAR, PDRY AND DHOFAR WAR

REF: MUSCAT 0585, SANAA 1378, JIDDA 4165, LONDON 8784

1. SUMMARY: AMIR OF QATAR TELLS US THAT HE IS GOING ALONG WITH
POLICY OF OFFERING "CARROTS" TO PDRY. HE ALSO SEES VALIDITY
IN "SHIELD" POLICY, WHICH HE ALSO IN EFFECT SUPPORTING.
IT APPEARS THAT SOME AREA STATES SEE A MIXED "SHIELD" AND
"CARROT" POLICY AS BEST SUITED TO REGIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES.
END SUMMARY

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2. HEAVILY ARMED WITH EXCELLENT ANALYSES PROVIDED IN REFTELS AND COMMENTS OF OTHER AREA POSTS, ON JUNE 12 I RAISED SUBJECTS OF RELATIONS WITH PDRY AND DHOFAR INSURGENCY WITH AMIR OF QATAR, SHAYKH KHALIFA BIN HAMAD AL THANI. AMIR RECALLED HIS PREVIOUS VIEW THAT IRAQ AND PDRY WERE PRINCIPAL THREATS TO SECURITY OF GULF BECAUSE OF STRONG SOVIET INFLUENCE IN EACH COUNTRY. HOWEVER, ACCORDING AMIR, EVENTS HAVE EVOLVED RAPIDLY IN RECENT MONTHS, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS IRAQ, ALTHOUGH SITUATION THERE REQUIRED CAREFUL WATCHING.

3. RE PDRY, AMIR SAID KING FAISAL'S IMPLACABLE HOSTILITY TO ADEN REGIME HAD NOW BEEN REPLACED BY MORE FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE ON PART OF PRESENT SAG, AND GOQ FOLLOWING SAUDI LEAD. KHALIFA INDICATED THAT EGYPTIAN POSITION THAT IT WORTH EFFORT TO TRY TO WEAN PDRY AWAY FROM SOVIETS ALSO INFLUENTIAL IN CONVINCING QATARIS TO GO ALONG. KHALIFA CLAIMED THAT SAUDIS ALREADY PROVIDING AID TO ADEN AND HE WAS TOO. HE CAUTIONED ME THAT QATARI AID TO PDRY WAS MOST CLOSELY HELD AND HE ASKED THAT HIS CONFIDENCE BE STRICTLY RESPECTED, SINCE THIS A SHARP DEPARTURE FROM PREVIOUS GOQ POLICY AND ANY LEAK COULD CAUSE HIM INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND COMPLICATE HIS REALTIONS WITH SUCH AREA STATES AS OMAN.

4. ON PERSONAL BASIS, I EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM THAT "WEAN AWAY" POLICY WOULD BE EFFECTIVE, AND SUGGESTED THAT PROOF OF THIS POLICY COULD ONLY BE CUTOFF OF PDRY SUPPORT TO DHOFAR INSURGENTS. AMIR REPLIED THAT HE HAD LECTURED PDRY FOREIGN MINISTER AT RABAT AGAINST ADEN'S SUPPORT FOR DHOFARI REBELS. HE ASSERTED THAT "WEAN AWAY" POLICY HAD WORKED IN PAST, AND, ALTHOUGH HE ACKNOWLEDGED THERE WERE GREAT DIFFERENCES, HE CITED EGYPT'S TURN-AWAY FROM SOVIETS AS A DRAMATIC EXAMPLE.

5. I SUGGESTED TO AMIR "SHIELD" POLICY ALTERNATIVE OF BUILDING UP YAR AND OMAN AS CONTAINING FORCES AGAINST PDRY. AMIR SAID HE HAD NO QUARREL WITH SUCH POLICY AND HE WAS ALREADY HELPING BOTH YAR AND OMAN GOVTS. HOWEVER, HE SAW NO REASON WHY BOTH POLICIES COULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED AT SAME TIME WHICH, AS PRACTICAL MATTER, IS BEING DONE. AMIR STATED THAT SUCCESS OF EITHER POLICY COULD DRAMATICALLY IMPROVE GULF SECURITY IN GENERAL, AND, IF IRAQ STAYED ON MODERATE PATH, GULF STATES

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COULD BREATHE MORE EASILY AND GET ON WITH THEIR DEVELOPMENT.

6. COMMENT: ASSISTANCE TO PDRY IS INDEED SHARP DEPARTURE FOR GOQ, WHICH HAS BEEN SCATHINGLY CRITICAL OF KUWAITI EFFORTS ALONG THIS LINE. SAUDI ESPOUSAL, OF COURSE, IS THE DIFFERENCE. AS AMIR HAS POINTED OUT, HE IS CONTRIBUTING TO BOTH "SHIELD" AND "WEAN AWAY" POLICIES, AND HE SEES NO PROBLEM IN SUPPORTING POSSIBLY CONFLICTING AIMS. LIKE SAUDIS, WE BELIEVE AMIR

PERCEIVES PDRY THREAT AS NOT MERELY CONFINED TO DHOFAR, BUT
AS A DANGER TO ENTIRE ARABIAN PENINSULA. HIS INSTINCT TO
FOLLOW SAUDI LEAD IS CERTAINLY OVERRIDING FACTOR IN HIS DECISION
TO OFFER A "CARROT" TO ADEN. ALTHOUGH WE INCLINED TO SUPPORT
"SHIELD" APPROACH RECOMMENDED BY SANAA, THIS MAY BE RESULT OF
US PROPENSITY, AGAIN POINTED OUT BY SANAA, TO SEEK A RELATIVELY
CLEAR SOLUTION. MIXED POLICY WHICH APPEARS TO BE EVOLVING AMONG
AREA STATES MAY HAVE ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR LOCAL CONVENTIONAL
WISDOM.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, DHOFAR WAR
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 14 JUN 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: RowellE0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975DOHA00690
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750208-0477
From: DOHA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750648/aaaabrlc.tel
Line Count: 125
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Reference: 75 MUSCAT 0585, 75 SANAA 1378, 75 JIDDA 4165, 75 LONDON 8784
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: RowellE0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 25 JUN 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <25 JUN 2003 by CunninFX>; APPROVED <04 NOV 2003 by RowellE0>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: QATAR, PDRY AND DHOFAR WAR
TAGS: PFOR, XF, MU, YS, SA, QA, YE, (THANI, KHALIFA IBN HAMAD AL)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006